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Abstract 
Behavioural biases describe a replicable pattern in perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, or 
what is broadly called irrationality. This paper adopts a primary data approach to investigate the effects of behavioural 
biases on security market performance in Nigeria. The objectives are in twofold: one, to examine the extent of behavioural 
biases among security market investors in Nigeria and, to examine the effects of behavioural biases on stock market 
performance in Nigeria. The paper employed questionnaire as instrument and the technique of correlation with Pearson 
Product Moment Coefficient to analyze a survey of 300 randomly selected investors in Nigeria security market. We find 
strong evidence that behavioural biases exists but not so dominant in the Nigeria security market because a weak negative 
relationship exists between behavioural biases and stock market performance in Nigeria. The paper recommends that 
individual investors in the market should engage the services of investment advisors which will reduce personal biases in 
the management of their portfolios. 
Keywords: Bias, Behaviour, Security market, Market performance, Psychology 
JEL: G11, Z10 
1. Introduction 
Researchers in the field of behavioural finance have compiled an impressive body of analysis suggesting that individuals 
do not act rationally all the time when making investment decisions. These findings have significant implications for the 
development of the securities market. The Nigerian security market is gradually pulling out of the 2008/2009 market crash 
and it is relatively stable now, but the stability of the future market is dependent on the decision making patterns of 
individual as well as institutional investors who trade daily in the market. Economic and financial theories are built around 
the key assumptions that human beings are rational agents who always behave in a logical way, taking all related 
information into consideration before making decisions, and with stable and consistent preferences over time. Classical 
economics defines rationality very logically, for instance, if an individual loves A better than B and B better than C, an 
economist would conclude that the individual prefers A to C, but this may not be so in real life situation, especially with 
financial investment. 
Though the field of economics has propounded many theories over the years on human behaviour, it has not been able to 
explain why people routinely make financial decisions that are irrational. There have been studies in the field of finance 
that explain and prove the way financial markets work, there are also studies that makes us understand the dynamics 
behind investments upon which many rules have been formulated. Although these rules on investment are simple, most 
investors have trouble consistently applying them. This leads to most investors either trading too much, buy and sell at 
precisely the wrong times, allow emotions to overrule logic, misjudge probabilities, or futilely chase performance. 
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While classical economic models explain what we should do, behavioural finance examines what we really do. 
Behavioural finance recognizes that our financial decisions are impacted by our human psychology, and uses the term 
"quasi rational" to describe how, when and why we sometimes behave "irrationally' as the classical economists put it. 
Behavioural finance classifies and categorizes the circumstances where the outlook we really have differs from the rational 
outlook we need to have in order to implement theories propounded by classical economist. This makes investors trade 
holdings when they should not, depending on instincts (Huckle, 2005). 
The Nigerian security market has been described by both market operators and professional bodies as illiquid as a result of 
the 2009 market crash. This is because many of the stock broking firms operating in the market incurred huge debt after the 
crash of equity prices and are unable to trade actively as they used to do. Investors also, in a bid to trade cautiously at times, 
conduct trade at the wrong times leading the market to underperform (Egwuatu, 2012).  They belatedly chase past 
performance, inadvertently selling low and buying high, and are swayed by emotions, the majority of investors have 
earned far less than posted returns: these actions are behavioural. 
Behavioural finance identifies two primary reasons which make investors to behave quasi-rationally. The first is 
because investors are human and cannot help but experience a range of emotions as investment prices move. These 
emotional reactions can inadvertently conflict with rational minds to distort the way market activities are perceived or 
misperceived. For instance, though it is understood that it is perfectly normal for investments to move in cycles, investors 
feel excited and euphoric when an investment is generating strong returns in the above-average part of its cycle - which 
sparks a powerful urge to buy when markets are high rather than following economic theory to buy when market is low. In 
the lower part of an investment cycle, poor returns create different view. Investors become despondent, anxious and 
panicky, and would instinctively seek to end the unpleasant experience by selling when they should be buying. Still, 
investors are tempted to replace these holdings with assets which make them feel excited.  Thus selling low and buying 
high - although rationally it is understood that the greatest financial opportunities occur at market bottoms, and risk is 
highest when investment cycles are at their peak. Therefore, logic and emotions are in conflict. 
The second area of irrationality has its roots in human cognitive factors.  Human perception of issues have developed fast 
and formed effective processes to swiftly handle information and speed our decisions.  While these are extremely useful 
in many areas of life, they can short-circuit our decisions in investment. When investing we're instinctively compelled to 
take more risks to avoid losses than to achieve gains. These counter reactions short change the market and retard 
development in the security market because we unconsciously become optimistic in a high market and pessimistic in a low 
market. For example, a study showed that 86% of Japanese investors expected further increases at the peak of the Japanese 
market, but after the market had collapsed a third of investors expected a further crash (Tokyo Watch,1997). 
Huckle (2004) comments that most investors’ preferences are inconsistent. The investor’s ability to think rationally is 
compromised further when his/her pattern-seeking traits combine with loss aversion to reinforce the urge to shy from low 
prices - even though research proves that asset classes and categories move in cycles. A basic requirement for profitable 
investment is to buy low and sell high as markets move through these cycles. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), opine that behavioural finance complements classical economic theories which are 
extremely effective when applied. However, investors are influenced by emotions and mental short-cuts that tend to 
disregard these rules. By using the lessons from behavioural finance to understand investment psychology, it is possible to 
recognize the likelihood of deviating from proven principles - and with this awareness effectively adapt and control our 
behaviour to dramatically increase the return from the market. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) explain that many 
anomalies in behavioural finance stem from the way information is framed - the way such information is viewed and 
interpreted before making a decision. Oslen (1998) argued how behavioural finance can help explain the puzzle of stock 
price volatility using chaos and adaptive decision making theories. Despite increase activities in behavioural finance 
studies, the trend in research has not provided sufficient justification for the link between behavioural finance and security 
market performance. Besides, empirical evidence emerging from various studies only show trends in behavioural biases 
which are sometimes not properly situated in any particular market. Research has also shown that most of the studies on 
behavioural biases that have been reported were carried out in mature markets. These mean that there is a gap in relevant 
literature on developing countries particularly Nigeria which happen to be the most populated country in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) with an emerging security market.  
This study attempts to fill the gap in literature by examining the situation in Nigeria and providing empirical evidence on 
the relationship between behavioural biases and security market development. This is the overall objective of this paper. 
The specific objectives are to: (i) ascertain the extent of behavioural biases in the Nigeria security market; (ii) ascertain the 
type of relationship that exist between behavioural biases and the security market development (iii) examine the effects of 
behavioural biases on security market development in Nigeria. The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. In section 
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II, relevant theoretical postulations and literature are reviewed while the methodology of the study is explained in section 
III. The findings of this study are presented in section IV, while section V contains the concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
The field of behavioural finance has gained popularity over the last three decades as the validity of assumptions underlying 
theoretical frameworks (such as the capital Asset Pricing Model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis) developed to 
analyse financial markets and hence, the practical application of these frameworks in the real world, have been 
increasingly questioned. Behavioural finance suggests that investors do not always act rationally when making investment 
decisions, even if they possess the inputs required to make a rational decision, such as information, knowledge, and 
understanding.  Attention was first drawn on the impact of human psychology on the stock market when Selden (1912) 
proposed that the movements of prices on the exchanges are dependent to a very considerable degree on the mental attitude 
of the investing and trading public. Much was not available on the field of behavioural finance until Pratt (1964) study on 
how individuals perceive risk and how this determines their level of trading in relation to their total earnings on the 
security market. The study concludes that perceived risk and most of the time the fear within are what determine the level 
of trading by individuals and not necessarily the risk presented by the market indicators. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) introduced availability heuristic - a judgmental heuristic in which a person evaluates the 
probability of events by availability, that is, by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind. The reliance on the 
availability heuristic leads to systematic biases which make people think that what they have in mind to do is the most 
correct despite what the market indicators present. This means that people do not always act rationally nor do they fully 
utilize all the information available to them.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) presented a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making 
under risk and developed an alternative model, known as prospect theory. Expected utility theory is unable to explain why 
people are often simultaneously attracted to both insurance and gambling. The paper found empirically that people 
under-weigh outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty; also that 
people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. Under the prospect theory, 
individual is risk-averse in relation to a known gain but risk-seeking in an effort to avoid a certain loss. Actual behaviour in 
a given situation depends on the sequence of events prior to that situation. For example, if an individual wins immediately 
prior to the time of the decision he/she is less likely to take a further gamble. However, if a loss has been incurred recently, 
then the individual is more likely to take a gamble in the hope of recouping such loss. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced framing - that people often change their mind when the same issue is presented 
to them in different ways. They proved that the psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems 
and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is 
framed in different ways. They show that many people vary their response to a question depending on how the question is 
asked or ‘framed’. If a number of different options are presented, issues such as numbering, the order in which they appear 
and the degree of difference between them will affect the choice made.  
Bondt and Thaler (1985) effectively started what is today known as behavioural finance. They discovered that people 
systematically overreacting to unexpected and dramatic news events results in substantial weak-form inefficiencies in the 
stock market. This was both surprising and profound. In an attempt to find out why people decide to hold on to their views 
when there are obvious reasons to change, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) performed a series of decision-making 
experiments and find evidence of status quo bias. This means that people would prefer to maintain their current position 
rather than move to a new position. In other words, they need to have a strong positive incentive to be persuaded to change 
a previous decision.  
Poterba and Summers (1988) investigated transitory components in stock prices and found positive autocorrelation in 
returns over short horizons and negative autocorrelation over longer horizons, although random-walk price behaviour 
could not be rejected at conventional statistical levels. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) developed a new version of prospect 
theory, which they called cumulative prospect theory. The theory employs cumulative rather than separable decision 
weights, applied to uncertain as well as to risky prospects with any number of outcomes that allows different weighting 
functions for gains and for losses. The theory which they confirmed by experiment—predicts a distinctive fourfold pattern 
of risk attitudes: risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability; risk seeking for gains and risk 
aversion for losses of low probability. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) propose value strategy that is, with understanding of investment life cycle, buy 
stocks that have low prices relative to earnings, dividends, book assets, or other measures of fundamental value and this 
will yield higher returns because these strategies exploit the sub-optimal behaviour of the typical investor. Bikhchandani, 
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Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) argue that the theory of observational learning, and particularly of informational cascades, 
can help explain the phenomena of stock market crashes. Motivated by a variety of psychological evidence, Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) present a model of investor sentiment that displays under-reaction of stock prices to news such 
as earnings announcements and over-reaction of stock prices to a series of good or bad news. 
Fama (1998) defends the efficient market hypothesis, and claims that apparent overreaction of stock prices to information 
is about as common as under-reaction. His argument is unconvincing, because under- and overreactions appear to occur 
under different circumstances and/or at different time intervals. He concluded that the way people react to stock prices 
depends on what they are going through at the moment. In support of Fama’s hypothesis, Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) propose a theory of security markets based on investor overconfidence explaining overconfidence 
to mean overrating one skill in a range of activities about the precision of private information and biased self-attribution 
which causes changes in investors’ confidence as a function of their investment outcomes which leads to market under- 
and overreactions. 
Odean (1998) tested and found evidence for the disposition effect, the tendency of investors to sell winning investments 
too soon and hold losing investments for too long. He demonstrated further that overall the trading volume in equity 
markets is excessive, and one possible explanation is overconfidence. He also found evidence of the disposition effect 
which leads to profitable stocks being sold too soon and losing stocks being held for too long. 
Psychological research has established that men are more prone to overconfidence than women (especially in 
male-dominated areas such as finance), while theoretical models predict that overconfident investors trade excessively. 
Barber and Odean (2001) found that men trade 45 percent more than women and thereby reducing their returns and 
conclude that this is due to overconfidence. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) found institutional investors having 
positive-feedback trade more than individual investors and institutional herding impacts prices more than do individual 
investors. This could be because the institutional investors trade in high volumes more than individual investors. 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) propose that firm-specific information, especially negative information, diffuses gradually 
across the investing public, and this is responsible for momentum in stock returns. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) identify 
the determinants of buying and selling activity and find evidence that past returns, reference price effects, tax loss selling 
and the fact that investors are reluctant to realize losses are all determinants of trading. 
Huckle (2007) describe behavioural finance as that aspect of finance that uses scientific models to explain how people 
make financial decisions in the real world, rather than in theory. Behavioural Finance shows how our human psychology 
influences our financial decisions and it identifies the consistent, predictable mistakes humans make when investing.  
Shefrin (2002) identified three main themes in behavioural finance explained as follows: 
a. Heuristics – People often make decisions based on approximate rules of thumb, not strictly rational analyses.  
b. Framing – The way a problem or decision is presented to the decision maker will affect his reaction.  
c. Market inefficiencies – There are explanations for observed market outcomes that are contrary to rational 
expectations and market efficiency. These include mispricing, non-rational decision making, and return 
anomalies. 
Mercer Consulting (2006) identified the following behavioural finance ‘biases’ affecting the actions of market participants 
on a daily basis. 
a. Overconfidence – People continually overrate their own skills in a range of activities. This trait has been 
shown to exist in business and finance, with decision makers overconfident of their abilities. 
b. Loss aversion – People appear to realize gains too quickly in the fear that their unrealized profit will 
disappear. In addition, they have trouble cutting their losses and tend to hold onto loss-making stocks too 
long in the hope of recovering their shortfalls. 
c. Confirmation bias – As an extension of overconfidence, people tend to see positive outcomes as 
confirmation that an earlier decision was soundly biased. When a favourable outcome occurs, they are less 
likely to reassess the underlying reasons for that outcome and the probability that gains will be repeated.    
d. Framing – Many people vary their responses to questions depending on how such question is presented or 
framed. 
e. Anchoring – People naturally tend to focus on specific values as bases for which to compare or estimate 
future possible outcomes. 
f. Status quo bias – People would prefer to maintain their current positions rather than move to new positions. 
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g. Myopic loss-aversion – People are more influenced by recent short-term fluctuations in the value of their 
investments than by the long-term implications. 
It is on these behavioural biases as identified by Mercer Consulting that this study is based. 
3. Research Methodology  
This study was designed to combine primary survey-based data with information extracted from secondary sources on 
stock market performance over the last twenty years. The population of the study consists of the entire security market 
investors in the country. However, the study was restricted to Lagos, as it has the largest concentration of investors in the 
country. Besides, Lagos is the commercial nerve centre of the country with a vibrant stock exchange that opens for trading 
daily. Simple random sampling technique was employed to select security market investors used in the study.  Applying 
the Taro Yamane sample size determination as reviewed by Glenn (2009), 300 was obtained to constitute the sample size. 
The 300 security market investors were randomly selected for the study to ensure unbiased sampling. Primary data was 
collected through administration of questionnaire. The questionnaire is made up of twenty items on the seven behavioural 
biases tendencies as identified by Mercer Consulting in 2006. The criterion for inclusion in the study includes the trading 
activities of the investor, as well as the pattern of decision making by the investors. To ensure the validity of the 
questionnaire, experts in the field of psychology were consulted to review the questionnaire on items with relation to 
comprehensibility, logicality and suitability. To ensure the reliability of the instrument used, the split-half method was 
used. To use the split-halves method, the samples were randomly divided into two halves and alternate form of reliability 
measure was estimated for half of the group. Results from the two halves are then compared. The alpha (α) reliability 
coefficients for the first and second halves of questionnaire are 0.7905 and 0.7890 respectively. This indicates that the 
research instruments are quite reliable. A pilot test which took the form of test re-test method was conducted prior to the 
actual study. Data collected from the questionnaire were analysed using one sample t-test and Pearson correlation 
coefficient techniques. 
4. Analysis of Results and Discussions 
4.1 Profile of Respondents 
The table below provides information on socio-economic profile of the respondents. Table 1 shows that 131 (63%) of the 
respondents were male while 78 (37%) were females. This confirms the fact that most investors in the security market are 
men. Finance and investing is often seen as male dominated field, although women also invest in the security market, but 
most of the activities in the security market are carried out by men. With respect to age distribution of respondents, the 
table also shows that 53 (25%) of the respondents are within the age group 18 – 24 years. Eighty- seven (42%) are within 
the age group of 25-34 years, 48 (23%) are within the age group of 35 - 50 years of age, 21 (10%) are within the age group 
of 51 years and above. This implies that most of the respondents are within the economic active age group, of 25 – 50 years 
which represents 64% of the total respondents. 
The result on educational qualification of the investors reveals that 31 (15%) of the respondents have secondary school 
education, 32 (15%) possess ordinary national diploma (OND), 92 (44%) are university graduates, 29 (14%) have masters 
degree in various fields, 11 (5%) have doctorate degrees. 14 (7%) are categorised as others. most of these have other types 
of educational qualifications such as professional qualifications in accounting stock broking and management. The result 
obtained is expected, the educational qualification of the respondents is very important in determining the respondents 
interest in the security market and management of security. From the survey, the result reveals that that 81 (39%) are single, 
86 (41%) are married, 32 (15%) are either divorced or separated, 10 (5%) are widowed. The marital status of the 
respondents is important to know their level of commitment to security management. In regards to the religion practice by 
the respondents, the table shows that 116 (55%) are Christians, 85 (41%) are Muslims, while 8 (4%) filled other forms of 
religion. Lagos state, where the research took place is not dominated by any religion. There are as many Christians as there 
are Muslims in Lagos State. On occupation of the respondents, the table reveals that there are 37 (18%) civil servants, 40 
(19%) professionals in the fields accounting, banking, finance, engineering, medicine and stock brokering. 66 (32%) are 
categorised as other investors. Included in this group are students, lecturers, administrators, etc. The implication of this is 
that the sample cuts across diversified groups involved in investment in the security market. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Some Variables 
Table 2 below displays the mean, standard deviation and standard error for the seven variables of Overconfidence, Loss 
aversion, Confirmation bias, Framing, Anchoring, Status quo bias and Myopic loss aversion. All the variables show the 
level of perception of the respondents and their attitude on each of the variables which indicates whether they are biased or 
not. Statistic values were used to form opinion based on measurement of scale. 
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Survey respondents indicated their perceptions using the scale, of 5 for strongly agree to 1 for strongly disagree. To 
examine the statement, “I trade excessively in the security market because I am sure of what step to take at all times to 
increase the worth of my investment”: a variable to test if the respondent overrates own skill (over confidence).  The 
hypothesis is developed and the level of significance for rejecting/accepting the hypothesis is agreed. The null hypothesis 
is: I do not trade excessively in the security market to be less than (2.5) the mean rating of own skill as rated by the investor. 
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is, “I trade excessively because I am sure what step to take to increase the worth of 
my investments”. The test of the variable returns a mean difference of 2.06 as seen in Tables 2 and 3.  Table 3 shows that 
the result is in favour of the acceptance of the null hypothesis, and it is highly significant. This means that the respondents 
do not overrate their own skills and therefore not over-confident of their abilities at managing their investments. From this 
study, it can be concluded that investors in the security market do not overrate their skills. Therefore, this bias (over 
confidence) is not rampant in the Nigeria security market. 
With respect to loss-aversion, the test of the statement ‘‘the fear of losing the amount invested sometimes overwhelms me, 
therefore I sell my security before maturity’’ was examined. The null hypothesis is taken as the fear of losing the amount 
invested does not overwhelm me. The alternative hypothesis is the fear of losing the amount invested sometimes 
overwhelms me. From the above table, the null hypothesis is accepted because the mean level is 2.28 and it is statistically 
significant. However, the mean level of confirmation bias shows a mean difference of 2.89, which implies that investors do 
not go back to reassess why a particular investment yields positive returns but are sure that future returns will still be 
positive. This means that the investors refuse to reassess future investments in anticipation that gain will be repeated. The 
t-test statistics for confirmation bias is 2.89 and the significance level is 0.00. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis accepted.  
Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation for framing, the mean value is 2.2. The t-test statistics for the statement, “I 
sometimes change my mind on an investment just because someone talks to me about it in a different way and not because 
of the facts I have on the investment”. The null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected. This 
implies that investors in the Nigerian security market do not just change their mind on a particular security just because 
pressures of persuasion is exerted on them, but rather rely on facts before taking decision on an investment. The result is 
significant at 0.00 
With regard to the variable, anchoring, we examine the statement ‘‘I rely on the high rate of return achieved in the market 
before as the benchmark for estimating future return on investment?’’. We developed the statistical test to check the 
variable anchoring in the Nigeria security market, with the null hypothesis to be ‘I do not rely on the high rates of return 
achieved in the market only to estimate the future outcome of my investment.’ The alternative hypothesis is: high rate of 
return achieved on the market in the past, is the benchmark I used in estimating return on my future investment. From the 
above table we accept the null hypothesis because the mean level of anchoring is 2.02 which is lower than 2.5 and it is 
statistically significant. We accept the null hypothesis, which implies that investors in the Nigeria security market do not 
rely on high rate of return achieved in the market only to judge the future outcome of an investment in the Nigeria security 
market. 
On status-quo bias, we examine the statement, “I prefer to maintain my current level of investment in the market rather 
than aim high”. The t-test statistics show a mean difference of 1.81 which impels us to accept null hypothesis and reject the 
alternative hypothesis. This implies that the investors in the Nigeria security market do not prefer to maintain their current 
level of investment in the market but rather aim high notwithstanding the current market situation.  Lastly, we test for 
myopic loss aversion in the market. We examine the statement “recent collapse of the market is enough reason never to 
invest in the security market again. Table 3, shows the mean and standard deviation for myopic loss averse; the mean value 
is 2.12, lower than 2.5 the average scale of satisfaction. The t-test statistics for the statement “recent collapse of the market 
is enough reason for me never to invest in the security market again” is 2.12 and the significance level 0.000. This means 
that the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected.  We can conclude our decision from the 
analysis that recent collapse of the market does not deter many investors from investing in the security market. 
Behavioural biases are not so dominant in the Nigerian security market. This can be summarized to mean that the recent 
collapse of the market is not due to behavioural biases but a systematic risk which could not be diversified away.  
4.3 Behavioural Biases and Stock Market Performance 
This section of the paper examines the relationships between the various investors’ behavioural biases and market 
capitalization, the variable used to measure stock market performance. The direction and the significant levels of the 
relationships that exist between each of the behavioral biases identified in the literature and market capitalization, using 
the Pearson Product moment coefficient correlation test are reported. The result obtained, shown in Table 4, below 
indicates that there are 209 cases which implies that there are no missing cases. For the first variable tested is 
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overconfidence. The table shows a correlation coefficient of -.244, this implies that the more the investors display a high 
level of overconfidence the lower the market performs.  A low negative correlation between overconfidence and 
market capitalization, suggest a weak relationship. The coefficient of determination which is the square of the r shows 
5.95%, that is, the variable overconfidence drops the market by 5.95% in Nigeria. This is significant at 5% significant 
level. Therefore, our null hypothesis which is there is no significant relationship between overconfidence and market 
capitalization in Nigeria is rejected, while we accept our alternative hypothesis, that there is a significant relationship 
between overconfidence and stock market performance in Nigeria. We conclude that overconfidence has a negative 
impact on stock market performance in Nigeria. Preliminary analysis was performed to ensure no violation of the 
assumption of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. The result shows r = -.24, n = 209, p< .038, with low level of 
overconfidence associated with negative low level of market capitalization. 
The table also shows the result of the variable, loss aversion and market capitalization. The table shows a correlation 
coefficient of  r -.130, this implies that the more the investors sell off their investment before maturity due to the fear of 
losing the initial amount invested, the lower the market perform, a low negative correlation between loss aversion and 
market capitalization, suggest a weak relationship between the two variables. The coefficient of determination r shows 
1.69%: the variable loss averse drops the market by 1.69%. This is also significant at 5%. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
which is there is no significant relationship between loss aversion and market capitalization in Nigeria is rejected, while 
we accept the alternative hypothesis, that there is a significant relationship between loss aversion and stock market 
performance in Nigeria, the result shows a weak negative relationship. It is therefore concluded that loss aversion has a 
negative impact on stock market performance in Nigeria. The result shows that, r = -.130, n = 209, p< .023.  
With respect to the variable, confirmation bias, the result obtained shows a positive relationship between confirmation 
bias and market capitalization with a correlation coefficient of .018, this implies that the more the investors rely on the 
past gain only to estimate future investment outcome, the more the market grows. However, the relationship is weak and 
not significant. Hence, the result obtained for this variable cannot the relied on as inferential for the Nigeria security 
market, though the coefficient of determination, r is 64%. In this case we accept our null hypothesis, which is, there is no 
significant relationship between confirmation bias and market capitalization in Nigeria and reject the alternative 
hypothesis. It is therefore concluded that confirmation bias has no impact on stock market performance in Nigeria.  The 
r obtained is .018, n = 209, p< .800.  
The next variable, framing has a correlation coefficient r as -.386. This implies that the more the investors subjectively 
change their decision on an investment as a result of persuasion and not based on facts, the market performance drops. A 
low negative correlation between framing and market capitalization suggest a weak relationship between the two 
variables. The coefficient of determination r shows 14.89% which is significant at 1%. Therefore, the null hypothesis, 
which is there is no significant relationship between framing and market capitalisation is rejected, while the alternative 
hypothesis, that there is a significant relationship between framing and stock market performance. The result shows a 
weak negative relationship. The r obtained is -.386, n = 209, p< .001. 
With respect to the variable, anchoring, the result obtained shows there is a positive relationship. Table 4 shows r .062.  
This implies that the more the investor focus on a specific value (either negative or positive) as a basis on which to 
compare or estimate the future possible outcome of an investment, the more the market grows but the relationship is 
weak and not significant. Hence, the result obtained for this variable cannot be relied upon to make inference for the 
Nigeria security market. The coefficient of determination r is 0.3%. The null hypothesis states that there is no significant 
relationship between anchoring and market capitalization in Nigeria is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected. 
This implies that anchoring has no impact on stock market performance in Nigeria. The result shows that r = .062, n = 
209, p< .375.  
Status-quo bias by the table shows a correlation coefficient of - r.146. This implies that the more the investors maintain 
their current level of investment and do not aim higher for fear of losing their investment, the more the market 
performance drop. A low negative correlation between status-quo bias and market capitalization means a weak 
relationship between the two variables. The coefficient of determination r is 2.13% which means that the variable, drop 
the market by 2%. The result is significant at 5%. The null hypothesis which says there is no significant relationship 
between status-quo bias and market capitalization in Nigeria is rejected, and our alternative hypothesis, which says there 
is a significant relationship between status-quo bias and stock market performance is accepted. Status-quo bias has a 
negative impact on stock market performance in Nigeria.  The r = -.146, n = 209, p< .037.  
Lastly, the result of the variable, myopic loss aversion shows a correlation coefficient of r -.178. This is interpreted to 
mean that the more investors are influenced by recent short-term fluctuations in the value of their investments than by 
the long-term implications, the more the market performs poorly. The coefficient of determination r is 3%. This is also 
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significant at 1%. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, while the alternative hypothesis, that there is a significant 
relationship between myopic loss aversion and stock market performance is accepted in Nigeria. The result also shows a 
weak negative relationship. We therefore conclude that myopic loss aversion has a negative impact on stock market 
performance in Nigeria.  The r = -.178, n = 209, p< .001, a low level of myopic loss aversion is associated with 
negative low level of market capitalization. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Although the field of behavioural finance has recently become rather popular an area for stock market performance, little 
or no empirical evidence exists to support behavioural theories in stock market performance in Nigeria. This is due to the 
fact that behavioural theories cannot be tested as easily as other traditional behavioural models. Proper assessment of 
behavioural theories requires detailed information on the trading strategies of various market participants, which are not 
easy to come by. This paper uses primary survey data combined with stock market performance data and offers a detailed 
look at the extent of behavioural biases in the Nigerian security market, as well as the consequence of such biases on stock 
market performance. The paper has tested certain behavioural biases as identified by behavioural finance experts on stock 
market performance: the trading attitude of randomly selected investors in the market was tested, using descriptive and 
parametric statistics. The investors were selected across discipline and age strata reflecting a cross section of the market 
participant.  
The paper finds strong evidence that overconfident, loss averse, framing, status quo biases and myopic loss averse exists in 
the Nigeria security market, though not dominant in the market because the result shows a low negative relationship, the 
resultant effect is that the market depreciates in value as investors exhibit behavioural biases. The result obtained is 
significant for all the behavioural biases identified except for confirmation biases and anchoring. This suggests that 
behavioural biases are exhibited by individuals from all sphere of life in their everyday trading activities in the market 
but most Nigerians do not trade directly on the market, they trade through their stockbrokers who are probably well 
trained to handle such behavioural biases. The paper concludes that, being aware of behavioural biases is the crucial first 
step in ensuring that the decision making process is not adversely affected by them. Rational decisions are more likely 
when there is sufficient information available to decision-makers and when that information is presented and analysed to 
recognise common pitfalls.  
Investors should be aware of the potential impacts behavioural biases can have in their investment decision making 
process at all levels, either as individual or institutional investors trading on the floor of the stock market, and also 
investment managers, consultants and trustees. Market participants should enter the decision making process with the 
objective of using the information, education, and understanding at their disposal to derive a solution being dispassionate 
in decision making. 
6. Recommendations 
1) Individual investors in the market should allow professionals to manage their portfolios; this will reduce personal 
biases in the management of the portfolio. 
2) Professionals in consulting and investment management should be exposed to the field of behavioural finance 
through workshops and seminars such that when decisions are been taken, behavioural finance tendencies will 
reduce. 
3) Capital market analysts and information providers in the Nigerian security market should think of a proper way of 
releasing information about the market to the public as this have a way of affecting the decision taken by the investor 
about the market. 
4) Institutional investors should impose limits on concentration on any one stock or sector that can be held by the 
organization. 
5) Collective views on an investment should be applied by fund managers and investors as this has tendencies of 
reducing individual personal biases on an investment. Formation of committees could be employed, though the use 
of committees has its own implications. 
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Table 1. SOCIO - ECONOMIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
 
Variables Measuring Group Frequency Percentage (%) 
 
Gender  
Male 131 63 
Female 78 37 











18 – 24 53 25 
25 – 34 87 42 
35 – 50 48 23 
50 and above 21 10 
Total 209 100 
Secondary 31 15 
OND 32 15 
B.Sc 92 44 
M.Sc 29 14 
PhD 11 5 
Others 14 7 




Single 81 39 
Married 86 41 
Divorced/Separated 32 15 
Widow 10 5 




Christianity 116 55 
Islam 85 41 
Others 8 4 




Civil Servant 37 18 
Professionals 40 19 
Stock brokers 66 32 
Other investors 60 29 
Student 6 3 
Total 209 100 




 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Overconfident 209 2.0680 .69510 .04843 
Loss averse 209 2.2808 .85884 .06028 
Confirmation bias 209 2.5971 .93067 .06484 
Framing 209 2.2136 .77962 .05432 
Anchoring 209 2.0276 .84644 .05897 
Status quo bias 209 1.8128 .88689 .06225 
Myopic loss 209 2.1268 .80044 .05590 
    Source: Researcher’s Analysis of Field Survey 2011 
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Test Value = 0                                        
t Df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Overconfident 42.700 209 .000 2.06796 1.9725 2.1634
Loss averse 37.838 209 .000 2.28079 2.1619 2.3996
Confirmation bias 40.052 209 .000 2.89709 2.4692 2.7249
Framing 40.752 209 .000 2.21359 2.1065 2.3207
Anchoring 29.633 209 .000 2.02757 1.6313 1.8638
Status-qou bias 29.123 209 .000 1.81281 1.6901 1.9355
Myopic loss 38.044 209 .000 2.12683 2.0166 2.2371
Source: Researcher’s Analysis of Field Survey 2011 
Table 4. Behavioural Biases and Stock Market Performance in Nigeria 
 Overconfidence  Market Capitalization 
Over confidence Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                   1 
                 
209 
                    -.244* 
                    .038 
                       209 
Market Capitalization Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
               -.244* 
                .038 
                 209 
                          1 
                        
209 
 Loss Averse Market Capitalization 
Loss Averse Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                    1 
                  
209 
                    -.130* 
                      .023 
                       209 
Market Capitalization Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
               -.130* 
                .023 
                 209 
                         1 
                           209 
  Confirmation Bias Market Capitalization 
Confirmation Bias Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                    1 
 
                  209 
                      .018 
                      .800 
                       209 
Market Capitalization Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                 .018 
                 .800 
                  209 
                         1 
 
                       209 
  Framing Market Capitalization 
Framing Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                    1 
 
                 209 
                    -.386* 
                      .001 
                      209 
Market Capitalization Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
               -.386* 
                 .001 
                 209 
                          1 
 
                       209 
  Anchoring Market Capitalization 
Anchoring Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                    1 
 
                  209 
                      .062 
                      .375 
                      209 
Market Capitalization Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                 .062 
                 .375 
                 209 
                          1 
  
                       209  
  Status-quo Bias Market Capitalization 
Status-quo Bias Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                    1 
 
                  209 
                    -.146* 
                     .037 
                      209 
Market Capitalization Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
               -.146* 
                .037 
                 209 
                         1 
 
                       209 
  Myopic Loss Market Capitalization 
Myopic Loss Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
                   1 
 
                 209 
                    -.178* 
                      .001 
                       209 
Market Capitalization Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2 – tailed) 
N 
               -.178* 
                 .001 
                 209 
                          1 
 
                       209 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).      ** Correlation is Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Author’s Compilation, 2012 
